

ADVANCED READING

PASSAGE 1

Immigrants' adoption of English as their primary language is one measure of assimilation into the larger United States society. Generally languages define social groups and provide justification for social structures. Hence, a distinctive language sets a cultural group off from the dominant language group. Throughout United States history this pattern has resulted in one consistent, unhappy consequence, discrimination against members of the cultural minority. Language differences provide both a way to rationalize subordination and a ready means for achieving it. Traditionally, English has replaced the native language of immigrant groups by the second or third generation. Some characteristics of today's Spanish-speaking population, however, suggest the possibility of a departure from this historical pattern. Many families retain ties in Latin America and move back and forth between their present and former communities. This "revolving door" phenomenon, along with the high probability of additional immigrants from the south, means that large Spanish-speaking communities are likely to exist in the United States for the indefinite future. This expectation underlies the call for national support for bilingual education in Spanish-speaking communities' public schools. Bilingual education can serve different purposes, however. In the 1960s, such programs were established to facilitate the learning of English so as to avoid disadvantaging children in their other subjects because of their limited English. More recently, many advocates have viewed bilingual education as a means to maintain children's native languages and cultures. The issue is important for people with different political agendas, from absorption at one pole to separatism at the other. To date, the evaluations of bilingual education's impact on learning have been inconclusive. The issue of bilingual education has, nevertheless, served to unite the leadership of the nation's Hispanic communities. Grounded in concerns about status that are directly traceable to the United States history of discrimination against Hispanics, the demand for maintenance of the Spanish language in the schools is an assertion of the worth of a people and their culture. If the United States is truly a multicultural nation—that is, if it is one culture reflecting the contributions of many—this demand should be seen as a demand not for separation but for inclusion. More direct efforts to force inclusion can be misguided. For example, movements to declare English the official language do not truly advance the cohesion of a multicultural nation. They alienate the twenty million people who do not speak English as their mother tongue. They are unnecessary since the public's business is already conducted largely in English. Further, given the present state of understanding about the effects of bilingual education on learning, it would be unwise to require the universal use of English. Finally, it is for parents and local communities to choose the path they will follow, including how much of their culture they want to maintain for their children.

PASSAGE 2

The refusal of some countries to extradite persons accused or convicted of terrorist act has focused attention on the problems caused by the political offense exception to extradition. Extradition is the process by which one country returns an accused or convicted person found within its borders to another country for trial or punishment. Under the political offense exception, the requested state may, if it considers the crime to be a "political offense," deny extradition to the requesting state. Protection of political offenses is a recent addition to the ancient practice of extradition. It is the result of two fundamental changes that occurred as European monarchies were replaced by representative governments. First, these governments began to reject what had been a primary intent of extradition, to expedite the return of political offenders, and instead sought to protect dissidents fleeing despotic regimes. Second, countries began to contend that they had no legal or moral duty to extradite offenders without specific agreements creating such obligations. As extradition laws subsequently developed through international treaties, the political offense exception gradually became an accepted principle among Western nations. There is no international consensus, however, as to what constitutes a political offense. For analytical purposes illegal political conduct has traditionally been divided into two categories. "Pure" political offenses are acts perpetrated directly against the government, such as treason and espionage. These crimes are generally recognized as nonextraditable, even if not expressly excluded from extradition by the applicable treaty. In contrast, common crimes, such as murder, assault, and robbery, are generally extraditable. However, there are some common crimes that are so inseparable from a political act that the entire offense is regarded as political. These crimes, which are called "relative" political offenses, are generally nonextraditable. Despite the widespread acceptance of these analytic constructs, the distinctions are more academic than meaningful. When it comes to real cases, there is no agreement about what transforms a common crime into a political offense and about whether terrorist acts fall within the protection of the exception. Most terrorists claim that their acts do fall under this protection. Nations of the world must now balance the competing needs of political freedom and international public order. It is time to reexamine the political offense exception, as international terrorism eradicats the critical distinctions between political offenses and nonpolitical crimes. The only rational and attainable objective of the exception is to protect the requested person against unfair treatment by the requesting country. The international community needs to find an alternative to the political offense exception that would protect the rights of requested persons and yet not offer terrorists immunity from criminal liability.

PASSAGE 3

As is well known and has often been described, the machine industry of recent times took its rise by a gradual emergence out of handicraft in England in the eighteenth century. Since then the mechanical industry has progressively been getting the upper hand in all the civilized nations, in much the same degree in which these nations have come to be counted as civilized. This mechanical industry now stands dominant at the apex of the industrial system. The state of the industrial arts, as it runs on the lines of the mechanical industry, is a technology of physics and chemistry. That is to say, it is governed by the same logic as the scientific laboratories. The procedure, the principles, habits of thought, preconceptions, units of measurement and of valuation, are the same in both cases. The technology of physics and chemistry is not derived from established law and custom, and it goes on its way with as nearly complete a disregard of the spiritual truths of law and custom as the circumstances will permit. The realities with which this technology is occupied are of another order of actuality, lying altogether within the three dimensions that contain the material universe, and running altogether on the logic of material fact. In effect it is the logic of inanimate facts. The mechanical industry makes use of the same range of facts handled in the same impersonal way and directed to the same manner of objective results. In both cases alike it is of the first importance to eliminate the "personal equation," to let the work go forward and let the forces at work take effect quite objectively, without hindrance or deflection for any personal end, interest, or gain. It is the technician's place in industry, as it is the scientist's place in the laboratory, to serve as an intellectual embodiment of the forces at work, isolate the forces engaged from all extraneous disturbances, and let them take full effect along the lines of designed work. The technician is an active or creative factor in the case only in the sense that he is the keeper of the logic which governs the forces at work. These forces that so are brought to bear in mechanical industry are of an objective, impersonal, unconventional nature, of course. They are of the nature of opaque fact. Pecuniary gain is not one of these impersonal facts. Any consideration of pecuniary gain that may be injected into the technician's working plans will come into the case as an intrusive and alien factor, whose sole effect is to deflect, retard, derange and curtail the work in hand. At the same time considerations of pecuniary gain are the only agency brought into the case by the businessmen, and the only ground on which they exercise a control of production.

PASSAGE 4

(This passage was originally published in 1905)

The word democracy may stand for a natural social equality in the body politic or for a constitutional form of government in which power lies more or less directly in the people's hand. The former may be called social democracy and the later democratic government. The two differ widely, both in origin and in moral principle. Genetically considered, social democracy is something primitive, unintended, proper to communities where there is general competence and no marked personal eminence. There be no will aristocracy, no prestige, but instead an intelligent readiness to lend a hand and to do in unison whatever is done. In other words, there will be that most democratic of governments—no government at all. But when pressure of circumstances, danger, or inward strife makes recognized and prolonged guidance necessary to a social democracy, the form its government takes is that of a rudimentary monarchy established by election or general consent. A natural leader emerges and is instinctively obeyed. That leader may indeed be freely criticized and will not be screened by any pomp or traditional mystery; he or she will be easy to replace and every citizen will feel essentially his or her equal. Yet such a state is at the beginnings of monarchy and aristocracy. Political democracy, on the other hand, is a late and artificial product. It arises by a gradual extension of aristocratic privileges, through rebellion against abuses, and in answer to restlessness on the people's part. Its principle is not the absence of eminence, but the discovery that existing eminence is no longer genuine and representative. It may retain many vestiges of older and less democratic institutions. For under democratic governments the people have not created the state; they merely control it. Their suspicions and jealousies are quieted by assigning to them a voice, perhaps only a veto, in the administration. The people's liberty consists not in their original responsibility for what exists, but merely in the faculty they have acquired of abolishing any detail that may distress or wound them, and of imposing any new measure, which, seen against the background of existing laws, may commend itself from time to time to their instinct and mind. If we turn from origins to ideals, the contrast between social and political democracy is no less marked. Social democracy is a general ethical ideal, looking to human equality and brotherhood, and inconsistent, in its radical form, with such institutions as the family and hereditary property. Democratic government, on the contrary, is merely a means to an end, an expedient for the better and smoother government of certain states at certain junctures. It involves no special ideals of life; it is a question of policy, namely, whether the general interest will be better served by granting all people an equal voice in elections. For political democracy must necessarily be a government by deputy, and the questions actually submitted to the people can be only very large rough matters of general policy or of confidence in party leaders.