

# ADVANCED READING

## PASSAGE 1

Shaw's defense of a theater of ideas brought him up against both his great bugbears—commercialized art on the one hand and Art for Art's Sake on the other. His teaching is that beauty is a by-product of other activity; that the artist writes out of moral passion (in forms varying from political conviction to religious zeal), not out of love of art; that the pursuit of art for its own sake is a form of self-indulgence as bad as any other sort of sensuality. In the end, the errors of "pure" art and of commercialized art are identical: they both appeal primarily to the senses. True art, on the other hand, is not merely a matter of pleasure. It may be unpleasant. A favorite Shavian metaphor for the function of the arts is that of tooth-pulling. Even if the patient is under laughing gas, the tooth is still pulled.

The history of aesthetics affords more examples of a didactic than of a hedonist view. But Shaw's didacticism takes an unusual turn in its application to the history of arts. If, as Shaw holds, ideas are a most important part of a work of art, and if, as he also holds, ideas go out of date, it follows that even the best works of art go out of date in some important respects and that the generally held view that great works are in all respects eternal is not shared by Shaw. In the preface to *Three Plays for Puritans*, he maintains that renewal in the arts means renewal in philosophy, that the first great artist who comes along after a renewal gives to the new philosophy full and final form, that subsequent artists, though even more gifted, can do nothing but refine upon the master without matching him. Shaw, whose essential modesty is as disarming as his pose of vanity is disconcerting, assigns to himself the role, not of the master, but of the pioneer, the role of a Marlowe rather than of a Shakespeare. "The whirligig of time will soon bring my audiences to my own point of view," he writes, "and then the next Shakespeare that comes along will turn these petty tentatives of mine into masterpieces final for their epoch."

"Final for their epoch"—even Shakespearean masterpieces are not final beyond that. No one, says Shaw, will ever write a better tragedy than *Lear* or a better opera than *Don Giovanni* or a better music drama than *Der Ring des Nibelungen*; but just as essential to a play as this aesthetic merit is moral relevance which, if we take a naturalistic and historical view of morals, it loses, or partly loses, in time. Shaw, who has the courage of his historicism, consistently withstands the view that moral problems do not change, and argues therefore that for us modern literature and music form a Bible surpassing in significance the Hebrew Bible. That is Shaw's anticipatory challenge to the neo-orthodoxy of today.

## PASSAGE 2

One of the many theories about alcoholism is the learning and reinforcement theory, which explains alcoholism by considering alcohol ingestion as a reflex response to some stimulus and as a way to reduce an inner drive state such as fear or anxiety. Characterizing life situations in terms of approach and avoidance, this theory holds that persons tend to be drawn to pleasant situations and repelled by unpleasant ones. In the latter case, alcohol ingestion is said to reduce the tension or feelings of unpleasantness and to replace them with the feeling of euphoria generally observed in most persons after they have consumed one or more drinks.

Some experimental evidence tends to show that alcohol reduces fear in the approach-avoidance situation. Conger trained one group of rats to approach a food goal and, using aversion conditioning, trained another group to avoid electric shock. After an injection of alcohol the pull away from the shock was measurable weaker, while the pull toward the food was unchanged.

The obvious troubles experienced by alcoholic persons appear to contradict the learning theory in the explanation of alcoholism. The discomfort, pain, and punishment they experience should presumably serve as a deterrent to drinking. The fact that alcoholic persons continue to drink in the face of family discord, loss of employment, illness, and other sequels of repeated bouts is explained by the proximity of the drive reduction to the consumption of alcohol; that is, alcohol has the immediate effect of reducing tension while the unpleasant consequences of drunken behavior come only later. The learning paradigm, therefore, favors the establishment and repetition of the resort to alcohol.

In fact, the anxieties and feelings of guilt induced by the consequences of excessive alcohol ingestion may themselves become the signal for another bout of alcohol abuse. The way in which the cue for another bout could be the anxiety itself is explained by the process of stimulus generalization: conditions or events occurring at the time of reinforcement tend to acquire the characteristics of state of anxiety or fear, the emotional state itself takes on the properties of a stimulus, thus triggering another drinking bout.

The role of punishment is becoming increasingly important in formulating a cause of alcoholism based on the principles of learning theory. While punishment may serve to suppress a response, experiments have shown that in some cases it can serve as a reward and reinforce the behaviour. Thus, if the alcoholic person has learned to drink under conditions of both reward and punishment, either type of condition may precipitate renewed drinking.

Ample experimental evidence supports the hypothesis that excessive alcohol consumption can be learned. By gradually increasing the concentration of alcohol in drinking water, psychologists have been able to induce the ingestion of larger amounts of alcohol by an animal than would be normally consumed. Other researchers have been able to achieve similar results by varying the schedule of reinforcement—that is, by requiring the animal to consume larger and larger amounts of the alcohol solutions before rewarding it. In this manner, animals learn to drink enough to become dependent on alcohol in terms of demonstrating withdrawal symptoms.


### PASSAGE 3

Changes in the volume of unemployment are governed by three fundamental forces: the growth of the labor force, the increase in output per man-hour, and the growth of total demand for goods and services. Changes in the average hours of work enter in exactly parallel fashion but have been quantitatively less significant. As productivity rises, less labor is required per dollar of national product, or more goods and services can be produced with the same number of man-hours. If output does not grow, employment will certainly fall; if production increases more rapidly than productivity (less any decline in average hours worked), employment must rise. But the labor force grows, too. Unless gross national product (total final expenditure for goods and services corrected for price changes) rises more rapidly than the sum of productivity increase and labor force growth (again modified for any change in hours of work), the increase in employment will be inadequate to absorb the growth in the labor force. Inevitably the unemployment rate will increase. Only when total production expands faster than the rate of labor force growth plus the rate of productivity increase and minus the rate at which average annual hours fall does the unemployment rate fall. Increases in productivity were more important than growth of the labor force as sources of the wide gains in output experienced in the period from the end of World War II to the mid-sixties. These increases in potential production simply were not matched by increases in demand adequate to maintain steady full employment.

Except for the recession years of 1949, 1954, and 1958, the rate of economic growth exceeded the rate of productivity increase. However, in the late 1950s productivity and the labor force were increasing more rapidly than usual, while the growth of output was slower than usual. This accounted for the change in employment rates.

But if part of the national purpose is to reduce and contain unemployment, arithmetic is not enough. We must know which of the basic factors we can control and which we wish to control. Unemployment would have risen more slowly or fallen more rapidly if productivity had increased more slowly, or the labor force had increased more slowly, or the hours of work had fallen more steeply, or total output had grown more rapidly. These are not independent factors, however, and a change in any of them might have caused changes in the others.

A society can choose to reduce the growth of productivity, and it can probably find ways to frustrate its own creativity. However, while a reduction in the growth of productivity at the expense of potential output might result in higher employment in the short run, the long-run effect on the national interest would be disastrous.



We must also give consideration to the fact that hidden beneath national averages is continuous movement into, out of, between, and within labour markets. For example, 15 years ago, the average number of persons in the labour force was 73.4 million, with about 66.7 million employed and 3.9 million unemployed. Yet 14 million experienced some term of unemployment in that year. Some were new entrants to the labour force; others were laid off temporarily. The remainder were those who were permanently or indefinitely severed from their jobs. Thus, the average number unemployed during a year understates the actual volume of involuntary displacement that occurs.

High unemployment is not an inevitable result of the pace of technological change but the consequence of passive public policy. We can anticipate a moderate increase in the labour force accompanied by a slow and irregular decline in hours of work. It follows that the output of the economy—and the aggregate demand to buy it—must grow by more than 4 percent a year just to prevent the unemployment rate from rising, and by even more if the unemployment rate is to fall further. Yet our economy has seldom, if ever, grown at a rate greater than 3.5 percent for any extended length of time. We have no cause of complacency. Positive fiscal, monetary, and manpower policies will be needed in the future.

